Negotiating Problems of Conventional and Non-Standard Grammar of European Identity
The most fundamental questions of who we are and how we might organize in our defense has a cogent, preliminary answer outlined by the Euro-DNA Nation.
We organize our identity as advocates of our people, who are of indigenous European descent, for the maintenance of our distinct genus on the whole and in the maintenance of our distinct species as well.
The very act of participating in the Euro-DNA Nation establishes a degree of merit to individuals as worthy members from the onset: This person is willing to undertake a minimal act in essential distinction of themselves and their group in flight or fight for the defense of European types.
There are additional qualities that need to be drawn-out by means of criteria other than close focus on genetics, of course. These particular qualitative concerns are provided for in the Euro-DNA Nation as well.
We may hypothesize and verify that we do have a definition of White/European Nationalisms which can move easily in consensus, neither yielding to slobs or snobs.
Although there is some confusion over what constitutes White/European Nationalism by way of slobs and snobs, there is a de facto consensus that all people of indigenous European parentage, including Russians, are valid members. With that, there is a normal provision that the various kinds of Europeans ought to be able to maintain their distinct demographics and not have them blended away, not even with other European types. This normal provision protects against the slobs, those who cannot see the depth and importance of European differences from one another and in some of their slovenly cases, not even seeing difference from non-Europeans. It also protects against snobbish definitions of White, which would deny the overwhelming Europeanness or the value of some European kinds; in this case again, they are not seeing or acknowledging a difference that makes a difference from non-Europeans. Their concerns that some patterns among those others which are unlike theirs and not distinctly European might damage their kind if integrated, are alleviated by the human ecological accountability of the particular national and subnational bounds.
Thus, by maintaining national, regional and communal differences and values we may handle concerns of the snobs and the slobs. The snobs, those who do not really care for certain native Europeans, not recognizing them as a part of “us”, may be placated by the fact that borders with these groups that they do not particularly care for are maintained. They have the means to stem limitless blending away. They do not need to throw these people overboard along with the non-Europeans. On the other hand, the slobs, people who have a tendency to be lax in recognizing the differences between Europeans or even worse, from non-Europeans, are, by the means of these national, regional and communal accountabilities, also prevented from going too far.
This framework allows for more and less pure alike, it maintains both genus and species of Europeans and thus provides a crucial basis that in theory might serve organizational grounds for our identity, its defense and expanse, even, into new territories.
We have answered the fundamental question of who we are as an identity. We have even answered to an extent the question of how that might be achieved. We have not answered how we might get people to act on this quite benign level of participation – although the pragmatic neutrality of unionization appears a clear ground and means for organizational incentive.
In any case, I am satisfied that fair premises have been set-forth on the fundamental question of who we are, that is, who we are advocating: people of native European descent and our discreet categories, including Russians.
For those who might harbor hatred against European neighbors for atrocities past, to where they even resent their legacy, I may offer this consideration – that the manifestation of their genetic legacy will probably reveal eventually any moral inferiority if that has in fact been carried forth on ill-gotten gains, and they will come to account for their injustice.
While we have resolved important theoretical complications and obstructions (see Leftism as a Code Word, my discussion of incommensurability and more), one obstruction remains intransigent to organization – those who wish to embrace Hitler and the Nazis, believing that they can be conducive to unification.
In theory, it seems clear that whatever good ideas they might have had can be approximately reconstituted (better, we can think these matters through anew), while we may drop whatever horrific mistakes, the epistemological blunder of theirs. Moreover, as Dr. Lister notes, we may drop its radioactive brand name. I share his disgust with those who cannot plainly see that necessity. I do not think Cobb was providing a service in promoting “White nationalism” by hoisting the swastika; on the contrary, that undoubtedly caused aversion to many worthwhile people. Defenders of this maneuver are the same sorts who say we should not offend Christians by being honest about what we think of this religion, that we should not use epithets and so on. But Hitler and the swastika, who could be offended? Ridiculous.
Despite the self delusions of his advocates, one of the reasons why many of us have been angry with Hitler and Nazism from the start is because they have given racial classification and protective discrimination on its basis – which are in fact a fundamentally necessary means of human ecology and accountability – a very suspicious and frightening image. And no, it is not all the fault of Jewish propaganda.
Make no mistake, the epistemic blunders of Hitler and the Nazis are clear enough, seized upon by Jewish propaganda obviously, but nevertheless, tactless and unwise enough so that racial classification has been stigmatized, successfully prohibited even, as “racist” and “white supremacist” in large part due to their lack of judgment.
This has long been a part of my disgust with the Nazis.
Their narrow, headlong, scientistic approach having stigmatized the very important capacity to protect patterns in protracted, developmental stages. I went through a phase where I had a chip on my shoulder with Germans about that – and the neo-Nazi Germans and Neo-Nazi German American types in particular, do tend to be weird in that you cannot be cool enough with them – no amount of honest claim that you advocate them and their nationality the same as other Europeans, that you are not interested in guilt tripping them, that you recognize failings in other Europeans as well, is enough. But even so, these weirdos can be transcended and put aside. Interesting to note, it was Polish people who encouraged me to divest myself of that angle of starting out critical of Germans.
Even so, I don’t believe that I should have to be apologetic for being against Hitler and Nazism. I am not against Germans, German nationalism nor even some ideas that the Nazis used. However, the Nazis were, to say the least, against some other Europeans and the war (which they claim to have had no choice in) was vastly destructive to European interests. They had some pointedly wrong ideas. Nevertheless, I can easily include Germans and their best attributes while the Hitler/Nazi brand cannot be symbiotic of European concordance. You can blame people for being against Germans, but you cannot really blame them for being against Hitler and the Nazis. Whatever the case, it is history and where the history created European destruction, it would be foolish to resurrect its lines and associations.
Clear though it may be, I do not trust myself to use the right psychology to get this simple message across, to disabuse Hitler fans that it is not all Jewish spin that is working against them (they are so dumb that my having a Polish American mother is enough to indict me in the eyes of Hitler enthusiasts); I can rather see creating intransigent identification as such. Enough of that for now. I can in fact, dismiss it as stupidity.
The aversion to Nazism is not only an image problem created by Jews on Madison Avenue. Part of it is rather because of the right’s tendency, probably in a quest for transcendent foundation, to reify matters, to take them out of systemic process and relation. And in a word, people are rightfully scared and/or repulsed by its lack of the wisdom of process, negotiative symbiosis and human ecology, agency and social accountability – “that’s just the way it is; tough luck sucker.”
As touched on in discussion between Asshole and I, the right’s light exists for a moment, shining on the provisional responsibility of stewarding and governing that whole social process, not to truncate it to where it is at odds with what might in fact be crucial systemic constituents, supportive, buffering, instructive, circumspect, formative or otherwise elements of itself.
The problem remains, now that we do have a brand, including Germans and excluding Nazis, a product which should be viable, popular, but is not, why is not popular yet? I suppose that there are marketing issues that should be gotten into, but that is for another time and place. For now, we might need to go deeper than marketing still, into the nuts and bolts of communication itself.
Shotter is a communications professor, a social constructionist and a communitarian. I am not endorsing all prescriptions of Shotter nor of this piece written years ago, but I believe the issues discussed are worth looking at. While my brief experience with trying to practice communitarianism soured me on the notion. I found a gossipy hell fostering demented egos beyond any decency – you find out how weird people can be in small town life; and I much prefer the less direct loyalty and anonymity of nationhood fostered by the anonymity of city life along with the functional, pragmatic loyalty of unionization – in my experience I’ll take that over “community” and heavy psychological, emotional ties. I would still like to hear Dr. Lister expound on the matter for my better appreciation (though he might not be willing).
Aversion to my effort to make the Euro-DNA Nation popular may well be due to my personality and my nonstandard grammar. Therefore, I intend to do something about that: I will begin rather to provide some analytical tools for examining the grammar that may obstruct our organization of White/European identity; and more non-standard grammar which may prompt ideas as to how our identity might gain vivification, guiding way to organize our authentic and popular strength.
Fortunately, Majority Rights DNANations is the right place to analyze such minutia of identity. This paper of mine from a graduate class is looking at the “enemy camp” of the ontology project. It is in fact, in the realm of deontology. Even so, that is not to say that it cannot be instructive and informative to an ontology project to examine the resources of “enemy practitioners.”
One idea of this school has been to avoid “why” questions as they tend to generate causally lineal answers while asking “how” questions by contrast, has the positive effect of tending to generate theory. However, this piece provides some clues as to why that question – how? – is not working to galvanize White/European advocacy. The question is indeed, why?
Analysis: John Shotter’s “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of ‘You”- Part 1
Introduction: Whether used for special investigation or simply as used through ordinary language, “ways of making sense of the world”, or “language games,” are characterized by grammars. Different language games entail different grammars; these grammars are logics of meaning and action – grammars (re) constructing a) “discursive structures” – i.e., resources manifest clearly enough to suggest social rules that afford and constrain how endeavors should proceed, and b) “deontological necessities” – prohibitions and obligations: as opposed to transcendent or foundational ontological morality, de-ontological necessities are non-transcendent moral rules which, despite affordance and constraint of action by discursive structures, remain mutable and multi-interactive as are the discursive structures that they reconstruct.
That is not to say that the practitioner within a discursive structure will assent to the notion of deontological as opposed to ontological necessity. For prime example, in the language game of scientific endeavor, two grammatical ontico-polarities emerge. In the first case, of behaviorism, investigation is conducted with a third person passive emphasis – the observer, being part of a deterministic universe, “merely observes and records atomistically causal necessity.” As self-reflexivity is negated, so to is deontological accountability. The second stance is that of a typical cognitive school; it conducts research from the grammar of first person possessive. As social indebtedness is negated, again, so to is deontological accountability. Both of these polemic emphases are byproducts of Enlightenment “texts” – that is, a detached first person “I” (think therefore I am) acting toward a third person observational field.
Of more incisive interest, these Cartesian grammars impose not merely through the more culpable objectivist scientific endeavors and the non-reflexive overviews in social constructivist {1} work, but are remnant even within the specifications of scholarships more capable and deeply imbued with the temporal. In “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of You”, Shotter seeks in particular to attenuate this grammar’s scientistic effluence in the texts and practice of identity. By taking an ironic stance toward his own discursive rules (viz. a disabuse of the rigorous “how”), he is able to maneuver the notion of individuality into a more thorough social constructionist direction. This does (or can) rectify residual behaviorist tradition hankering within the constructivist work. However, Shotter takes as his primary foil the more intellectually idolized objectivism of the the first {2} Cognitive school, though not directly. Rather, he differerances from the grammar of motives of that school’s most formidable opponent – Rom Harré
Shotter asks, why not create a proviso to act “through differently structured means” than the conventional Cartesian starting place so that individuals might discover, as put forward in the Theatetus, “different aspects of [their] surroundings in relation to [themselves]?”; you might say that in order to rectify the Enlightenment’s legacy of brutal relativism, he leaves the constructionist fray momentarily for some Platonic “why-ning.”
THESIS: The thesis is two part. First, in this article Shotter seeks to deconstruct The Story Told through the (“the”) Enlightenment text(s) by distinguishing its grammatical starting point, the first person possessive: and in lieu of this grammatical emphasis he proffers an amelioratively overcompensating counter-text toward The Story Lived in second person address.
The second thesis is a metatext: As serious consideration of the possessive and detached relational grammar of The Story Told falls outside of JS’s language game, he opts to emphasize difference not so much from the Cartesian text, but tacitly against Rom Harre’s “Personal Being.”
Exemplary of most counter-Enlightenment texts it has begun with the same grammatical starting point, changing only the relational emphasis from a possessive to a more active voice; according to Shotter, this is insufficient emancipation from The Story Told of uninvolved individuality. But interestingly, as passivity is rejected in Social Constructionism, the apparent alternative text of the second person passive also falls outside of JS’s language game. Thus, his proffered counter text of The Story Lived in alternative relationality, not having recourse to passivity, must negotiate novel grammar.
Key Terms:
Not having recourse to a “middle voice” (as did ancient Greek) JS introduces the novel grammatical implication of active and “acting into” voice to describe discourse between first and second persons. He also describes the discursve activities between voices in terms of “addressivity”, which pertains to the necessity of pronominal address in our identity creation. “Specificatory structures” are the partly finished logics of meaning and action that we are offered in address, to afford and constrain, shape and craft clearer sense making. And terms of “conjoint or joint action” deal with a non-lineal, but socially participatory notion of coherent identity. “Stories Lived” approximate the distinction, blurry and interrelated as it actually is, between rules of conjoint enactment and hermeneutic rules less bound to physical reality. Stories Lived through conjoint creation I contrast with Enlightenment “Stories Told” of artificially possessive and detached individualism.
Again, “discursive structures” are resources manifest clearly enough to suggest social rules that afford and constrain how endeavors should proceed. “Deontological necessities” are prohibitions and obligations; as opposed to transcendent ontological morality, de-ontological necessities are non-transcendent moral rules which, despite affordance and constraint of action in discursive structures, remain mutable and multi-interactive as are the discursive structures they reconstruct
Other frequent usages are {3}: a) making common: playing on the etymology of communication, it deals with the purpose of communication, viz. to achieve common understanding b) deontics: non-transcendent, interactive moral rules. c) enmesment: necessary participation in rules d) praxis: reflexive, agentive and socially negotiated reality e) rules: a different and potentially more agentive way of looking at necessity than standard physics models f) tfg’s: what is taken for granted, frequently a cause of intransigent conflict g) logical force: the degree of compellingness of a rule h) reflexivity (of effect or need): interactional or agentive response of observed, as opposed to lineal and passive results in forces and impacts. I introduce the term i) “corprisocial” to indicate the physical entering point to discursive structures.
Because Harré and Shotter’s common deontic language game, viz., discursive structure, bears as a melding and differencing point between their usages, I use the term of discursive structure as common ground, and finally contrast that to the terms which Harré uses concomitantly, “appropriation, position and order”:
Appropriation is how he sees identity is garnered, position describes varying capacity and responsibility to the order, which is a moral field of relation (Shotter uses the latter two terms, position and order, as well) with Shotter’s differences – specifically, Derrida’s “Differance” {4}. (yes, I despise Derrida now as I did when I wrote this).
I use the thematic metaphor of Appropriation versus Differance to underscore the central objective of my article. “Appropriation”, a mechanistic metaphor, has crept into the masterful constructionist work of Harré; inasmuch, it symbolizes indebtedness to prior ways of talking (prior discursive structures). The Appropriated discursive structure of Social Constructionism (Shotter and Harré are among “charter members of its constitution”) provides background in which Differances of this article are embedded. And “Differance” is Derrida’s deconstructionist metaphor for a contrast internally related to its context; Shotter is not abandoning internal dependence on the Social Constructionist context, but differing with some habits in order to deconstruct pejorative habitual influences.
Partition: To complicate matters further, I too am tracing Shotter’s position from within this overlapping framework, and with the same social constructionist take. This article uses the same pentadic arrangement as does Shotter. He describes 1. a notion of coherence 2. a relationship of knower to known 3. a purpose 4. what counts as data – a unit of observation and a unit of analysis and 5. how those data count. With great attention Shotter moves the analytical frame from paragraph to paragraph, from sentence to sentence, and sometimes from word to word (!) in a continuous hermeneutic circle establishing his differances to a social constructionist notion of identity. In overstating the relationship of knower and known, he does create a qualitative difference in the rules of this frame. Nevertheless, intentionality and perspective remain similar enough to render for this critique a challenging task of “elaboration and transformation.” As Shotter makes clear, there must be differences, changes and contrast from a given account (if not “creative misunderstandings”) if there is to be any way to judge its meaning, and thus for there to be any understanding at all. If I am to differ while using the same pentad, it is imperative to elaborate his tight analysis and highly regulative scheme against the transformative background of a more protracted form of the structure (i.e., a wider frame and “interior” information which does not circle from sentence to sentence). Therefore, though Shotter’s pentad circles against myriad sources, including those which go into making Harre’s positions, I organize Shotters Differances of the pentad more simply against Harre’s Appropriations thus:
First, against Harre’s notion of person positions in relation to one another, each making themselves coherent through reflexive reflection as prospective first persons by means of appropriations from third person constructions, voices in conversation, Shotter moves individuality into the more rigorously actional and practical involvement of joint shaping and crafting of coherence through second to first person address.
Second, JS takes Harre’s notion of relationship of pre-nominal person positions acting toward, and appropriating voice from third person conversation, and largely reverses it to where the provisional relation of second person voice directs specificatory structures toward pre-nominal persons in conjoint negotiation of relation.
Third, from Harre’s quest for the “how to” practicality of individual agency, JS differances by asking “why.” Arguing that asking “how”only leads back to the Story Told of detached individuality, he endeavors to shake its intransigence by proffering an overcompensating counter-text toward the Story Lived in relation to others in second person to first person interface
Fourth, appropriating Harre’s observational field constituted, in his analysis, with empirical person positions, JS differs by using smaller, more active units of observation – momentary situations – and analysis – Voice and Person of the verb as unintelligible apart from what they do.
George addressed with a socially ideal but responsible Altercast contrary to his individualist plans…
Fifth, against Harre’s notion of accountability as possible through the creation of coherent individuality, wherein data count as one is able to conceive of oneself as an individual, JS contends that individuality is, and can only be, constructed through accountability to the data of pronominal positions.
George is addressed with a consideration of acting-into an altercast position in conflict with his less than socially ideal plans.
As opposed to a libertarian, prioratizing dreams of individual adventure and world travel, George contemplates acting-into, shaping and crafting the specificatory structure altercast by Mary, who addresses him as a man of ideals, which of necessity compel adjustment of those priorities to practical duty: to a position rather as husband and community builder, upheld against capitalist destruction thereof.
…
Analysis: John Shotter’s Social Accountability and the Social Construction of “You” - Part 2
In pursuit of this analysis, we may usefully trace background to Shotter and Harre’s negotiated concerns here: “The Verum Factum Principle”
From Wikipedia:
“Giambattista Vico is best known for his verum factum principle, first formulated in 1710 as part of his De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda (1710) (“On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, unearthed from the origins of the Latin language”).[7] The principle states that truth is verified through creation or invention and not, as per Descartes, through observation: “The criterion and rule of the true is to have made it. Accordingly, our clear and distinct idea of the mind cannot be a criterion of the mind itself, still less of other truths. For while the mind perceives itself, it does not make itself.” This criterion for truth would later shape the history of civilization in Vico’s opus, the Scienza Nuova (The New Science, 1725), because he would argue that civil life – like mathematics – is wholly constructed.”
Analysis: John Shotter’s Social Accountability and the Social Construction of “You” – Part 2
I. Coherence of conjointly constructed individuality Differanced to Coherence of individuality acted into through the address of deontical positions of Voice by those of actively involved Person.
From Social Constructionist Coherence as conjoint creation of persons in relation to one another, a notion of coherence is set out with the deontical positions of Voice and Person of the verb; viz., JS focuses on activities of the second Person addressive Voice in construction of coherence.
Appropriating Harre’s use of social constructionist coherence wherein the conversation of everyday moral orders (read “order” to connote “third person”) corporeal Persons in relation to one another (read as “first persons”) make their individual Voices coherent through reflexive reflection on the obtainment and possession (possessive) of conjointly constructed discourse (passive), Shotter Differances from the vestigial cognitivism by taking Voice and Person into the rigorous maxim that any enunciated continuity of social life must speak toward its continual activity and thus, practical involvement. In Shotter’s notion of coherence, i.e., grammars of address, activities of discourse enable personal continuity as individual coherence is created through constraints and affordances of address. Voices of address altercast persons specificatory, or partly structured deontic operators which “you’s” act into – and through which they craft and shape the coherent, yet developmentally susceptible stories of their history and identity – to become “I’s”. Embeddedness within second person coherence, in lieu the third and first person narratives of enlightenment texts, emphasizes wherein addressive voice to you in temporality is a-priori necessary to any unified, agentive I. JS proceeds to engender this non-Cartesian text of conjointly constructed individual coherence by evincing its preliminary indebtedness to 1) internal relation and 2) its permanence through accountability.
Appropriating Harre’s use of social constructionist coherence wherein the conversation of everyday moral orders (read “order” to connote “third person”) corporeal Persons in relation to one another (read as “first persons”) make their individual Voices coherent through reflexive reflection on the obtainment and possession (possessive) of conjointly constructed discourse (passive), Shotter Differances from the vestigial cognitivism by taking Voice and Person into the rigorous maxim that any enunciated continuity of social life must speak toward its continual activity and thus, practical involvement. In Shotter’s notion of coherence, i.e., grammars of address, activities of discourse enable personal continuity as individual coherence is created through constraints and affordances of address. Voices of address altercast persons specificatory, or partly structured deontic operators which “you’s” act into – and through which they craft and shape the coherent, yet developmentally susceptible stories of their history and identity – to become “I’s”. Embeddedness within second person coherence, in lieu the third and first person narratives of enlightenment texts, emphasizes wherein addressive voice to you in temporality is a-priori necessary to any unified, agentive I. JS proceeds to engender this non-Cartesian text of conjointly constructed individual coherence by evincing its preliminary indebtedness to 1) internal relation and 2) its permanence through accountability.
Permanence of Accountability – Person [Coherence depends on permanent relatedness to Persons]. In the verities of relatedness and continual activity, individual continuity is dependent upon the directive person of the verb; in rejecting an objective starting point, i.e., individuality being achieved through equally viable possessive positions, it is rather as second persons that accountable means, speech genres of coherent rights, privileges, and obligations are (at least originally) made available. Presence of the individual “other” provides antecedent and essential directives by which to complete intentionality; thus, continuity of a person’s point of view is permanently indebted to second persons for whatever first person possessive agency or third person autonomy accounted. Further, as people are beings created, nurtured, and informed by other beings, especially predecessors, they are permanently related and developmentally susceptible to directive structures into which they might account, reconstruct, or rebel against in establishment of any coherent voice of autobiography. So Differancing from “extra-discursive theory”, J.S. Takes the putative remnant (possessive pure agency) directly “into” continual deontical accountability to Second Person You
You being in continual relation and commotion of the social, sometimes messy process
Summary: Given the inexorable commotion of continual relatedness, the first person active voice in connection with a transcendent theory, and concomitant third person passive voice assuming a scientistic detached stance as the receptor of sensory input from a fixed social order, are impractical. Any constancy, uniqueness, or autonomous agency of individuality must be internally related to others, thus subject to permanent accountability in actional criteria. Hence, the Appropriated Social Constructionist notion of coherence, wherein first Persons appropriate and reflexively reflect upon the coherence of their Voices from a third person panorama, is Differanced to preliminary and permanent indebtedness: 1. The Enlightenment context remnant third person view of persons in detached relation to one another is deconstructed by favoring individuality making sense through Internal Relation to public display as second Persons accounted valid by other individuals. 2. The Enlightenment context remnant of unified agency which issues out from the voices of equally viable possessive positions is deconstructed by favoring the Permanent Indebtedness as accountable Voices in relation to second persons for any achievements of autonomous narrative. This coherence of individuality through internal relation and permanent indebtedness elaborates a reversal in the traditional relation of individual knower to what is known of one’s self.
II. The Relationship of Knower to Known which is Corporeal Persons Acting Toward conversational voice is Differanced to Knower Knowing Individuality Through the actable into Addressivity of Conversational Voice toward their active person
As the critical turn takes a stance of research through participatory involvement rather than contemplative withdrawal, self knowing is constructed with other persons; but since Social Constructionist texts have typically begun from the Cartesian first person starting point in relation of knower to known individuality, Shotter deconstructs this text by taking a second person starting point in relating knower to known.
JS Appropriates Harre’s use of this relationship, in which pre-nominal first person positions act toward and appropriate voices from a third person conversational field, and Differances by reversing it to where the provisional relation of the conversational voices is viewed as being directed to pre-nominal second person positions.
What am I, chopped liver?
Specifically regarding the relation of knower to their known individuality, Shotter takes his point of departure from Harre’s (1983, p. 168) thesis for the social construction of the pronoun “I”; viz., “the necessary condition for acquiring the use of ‘I’ is the capacity to use ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘we’, ‘Mary’, ‘John’, etc.” Shotter then advances this point to where Harre’s notion of relationship [suggested more in stylism than in perfect understanding of his intent] – i.e., person (pt of view) acting-out toward conversation (pt of action – obtuse active voice of address) is reversed to its being through conversation (acute passive voice of address – pt of action) that I’s act-into conjointly create their person (pt of view).
Persons toward conversation: “No resolution of the antithesis between referential and non-referential uses of “I” that has emerged is subsuming the other. In each case the making of counter-arguments can be treated merely as demonstrations of the need to admit the viability of the other concept in our and psycholinguistic practices” (Harré 1983, p 79). With that Harré argues that a corporeal person must conceive of themselves as a conscious unitary agent, a theoretical self capable of reflexive self consciousness if they are to be singularly accountable and socially intelligible. Thus, he leaves the question of why this referential non-referential distinction is made in favor of asking how a person can accomplish individuality within this “Bohr-like complementarity”. Within full social constructionist matrix, he endeavors to establish a model to rescue the personal agency and unified autonomy of individuality over and against causal systems by means of defiant, but by no means naïve use of traditional dichotomy. In lieu of inner-outer, he proposes a hierarchically organized relationship of knower to known individuality which distinguishes an empirical public collective (referential “I”) indexically marshaling from public conversation an open-ended transcendent theory of private/individual (non-referential “I”); for “the long history of Cartesian distinctions must reflect some important aspects of the psychological functioning of human beings. It can hardly have convinced so many if it were wholly without some empirical foundation (ibid. p 44).” 2,764
Conversation toward persons: Shotter contends that the reason this kind of talk holds sway is not because it has some “empirical foundation” – “There ain’t no such things as I’s and You’s”, not for more than a moment anyway.” Like James and Beneventine, he believes little can be said of involvement through a first person possessive starting point beyond its being “a pencil” – and even that is preceded by directive relations to others. Perhaps the Enlightenment frame starting with agentive “I’s” acting toward the passive conversation of second person yous or third person theys might simply as well be set aside for a new way of talking about individuality – though a frame beginning with the conversation of second person address jointly acted-into by persons, the hierarchical relationship of knower to transcendently known individuality might be farther deconstructed in differance to a knower immanently related to other known individuals. But Shotter argues that if this remnant Cartesianism is to be disabused, we must first answer why “we feel so strongly that there must be a unitary and total way to refer to what we are.” Advancing Harre’s hypothesis viz. Acquistion of pronominal address is requisite to abstracting “self concept” from the public domain, Shotter “describes” a coevolution of found and sought individuality: While derived “horizontally” in constitutive rules of deployment deeply enmeshed in hierarchical social orders, pronominal positions also serve as regulative rules of accountability, characterizing the conversation toward our person with requiremental clues to the kind of knowable individuality sought.
Summary: Thus, the reason we feel (we are regulated to act) that there must be a unitary and total way to refer to what we are is due to the fact that we are deeply enmeshed in (accountable to constitutive rules) already established ways of speaking. This allows us to account to them in a seemingly natural way, as all texts must be partly taken for granted. Therefore, in a seemingly natural way we ask “how” do we establish individuality? However, the enactment of the occidental text’s first and third person relationship of knower to known has the effect of removing us from corprisocial indebtedness. In taking the individual knower back to a relation of contemplative withdrawal, it removes them from the sources of their individuality which is constructed through participatory involvement with others. Therefore, if we are to establish individuality, we must elaborate and specify “why” we feel so strongly accountable to this notion of relationship.
III.Rhetorical hermeneutic’s Purpose of the “how to” practicality of individuality is Differanced by asking “why” it recreates The Story Told of detached individualism, and by proffering a counter-text of The Story Lived in active relation to others.
Social Construction of individuality is concerned with the means by which the personal is constructed, the praxia activity of how people interact in the creation of rhetorical, hermeneutic (“textual”) accounts of themselves: To handle the relation between knower and known in the co-evolution of these accounts, a critical interpretive approach is taken which uses circular attention to context and particulars of how stories/practices reflexively reconstruct both interpreter and interpreted. Finding that this leads back to the purposes of Enlightenment texts Shotter counter-textualizes individualism lived through accounts in addressivity as yous.
Asking “Why?” tends to lead to teleological and lineally causal explanations.
Appropriating Harre’s Pupose for the “how to” practicality of individual agency, JS Differances in the manner of 1. Platonic “why-ning”: Since “how to” reconstructs the Cartesian Story Told of detached individuality, he has asked “why” and endeavors to Deconstruct the intransigence of that story by Taking The Hermeneutic Turn to a Didactic extent, creating 2.“Buzzwords” of an amelioratively overcompensating counter-text toward the Story Lived though activities relating to immediate others.
Deconstructing the traditional textual Story Told and proffering a counter-text of the Story Lived.
1. Platonic “why-ning” – differing from the critical-interpretive emphasis on “how to”: In present milieu, the quest of how reverts to persons taking the anachronistic concept of detached individualism. Thus, of necessity JS deconstructs the traditional Story Told by asking “why” occidents are so inclined to this appropriative way of talking – he finds it is in part a) custom, due to their accountability to these texts, and b) part inherent invisibility to/of the language game’s reflexive effects of non-accountability – a bi-produced “pure” agentive self, “acting-out” of a “possessed (ha!) location”, i.e., “rational blindness.”
To exorcise the possessed self
Rational blindness to relational enmeshment: In everyday practices persons are accountable for correctly (re) constructing (regulative use of) the resources (obligations, prohibitions, and legitimacies) constituting the taken for granted depth grammar rules of their culture. In the case of occidental texts of individuality, accountability to cultural grammar means that one is responsible for the mastery and correct enmeshment of the particularized requirements of its pronominal forms. Specifically, one is obligated to the agentive voice and the first person possessive “I” in relation to passive second persons yous and third passive person theys – this is a very powerful reflexive need: to fail in the situated usages of these rules is to risk prohibition from the very resources by which one’s being human is constituted. Paradoxically, this individualistic obligation reflexively effects disengagement of people from corprisocial, deonitc and hermeneutic abilities from which to construct and practice their individuality; and on a deeper level this narrative “rationally blinds” enmeshed individuals from recognizing the Story Told as being a text – persons feel so strongly that they must talk in the manner of possessive agency due to their accountability to a text which enjoins its own interpretation as a text through prohibition of recourse to hermeneutically interpreted relatedness and by obligating the notion of perceptive immediacy (and the unassailable equality thereof).
Mary (Donna Reed) acts-into the immediate opportunity of the moment…
…and begs to Differance from the detached way…
Shotter Denies that there is much content to self assertions, be they in the inward proprioceptive direction or toward the outward end of a trans-social character. Perhaps one can merely open their eyes to a mirror and perceive aspects of a person in the Lockeatine sense, but this perceptual immediacy is not an unassailable truth nor does it mean as much, i.e, it has nothing to do with the way ordinary folks talk about individuality until one has plagiarized socially accountable and mutable sequences of words through which to enact perception of it (Harré declared emphatically, no wonder David Hume could not empirically perceive a self!). Along with the explanation of this (guilt ridden?) half blindness to the process of “unconsciously” appropriating one’s grammars of individuality Shotter wants to explain why third and first person personages of the verb create dubious moral orders. As the appropriated from occidental text transforms recognition from social indebtedness, it elaborates the objectivist/ subjectivist – relativist notions of mechanistic coherence (artificial possession – “that’s just their/my prerogative”) and causal individual necessity – (the “truth of that’s just the way it is”), ideas which do not entail a personal moral responsibility to other individuals (see sections 4 and 5). In hopes of establishing ways of talking which readily acknowledge indebtedness to others, he proffers a new grammatical starting point emphasizing the relational nature constituting selves or identities – that is, he differances from the rhetorical stance with a counter-text toward the reflexively needed Story Lived.
Appraised of the objectivist Voice’s lack of responsibility…
2.Buzzwords – Shotter takes the hermeneutic turn to a didactic extent: If accountability is to make sense, a counter-text must be available to Make Common acknowledgement of corprisocial, hermeneutic and deontic indebtedness to other individuals for providing the means of personal identity. To do this he disabuses the occidental Story Told of its traditional grammatical starting point which acts-out toward a concomitant detached stance – and proffers an ameliorative overcompensation toward the Story Lived in continual commotion of everyday social life as it entails normative involvement with the “Addressivity” of “Other Voices” to “Second Person ‘You’s” – in this counter text, overstating the internal relationship of “known to knower”, (my quote) beyond mere symbiosis, the rhetorical directives and hermeneutic interpretation of other voice “addressivity” is depicted as precursive for the active involvement in which situated discourses of individuality are imbued. If this text were made common (buzzwords) it may reflexively effect “differently structured means through which to act”, and (hopefully) recursively reconstructed normative attention to “different aspects of one’s surroundings in relation to one’s self” – that is, this way of talking would readily legitimize or obligate accountability to the grammar of second persons – as yous are imperative to provide the “Specificatory Structures Into” which pre-nominal persons may act and craft their individuality – their “I”. This text would prohibit the notorious imperviousness of traditional individual coherence; and it might begin to rectify the brutal relativism of the formal legacy by constituting accountability to actual persons in concrete situations as they are made through the continual activity of conjoint construction.
Summary: Social Constructionism’s “how to” purpose is more elegantly stated the praxia activity that goes into creating rhetorical hermeneutics. In order to handle the internal relation of questioner to questioned, a critical interpretive account normally uses circular attention first to context and then to the particulars of how stories/practices reflexively reconstruct both interpreter and interpreted. In this piece that takes two major forms 1. Platonic “why-ning”: JS differs from emphasis on “how to”, arguing that in lieu of an alternative, this quest leads back to the traditional Story Told of individuality; his purpose instead is to ask why and why not create “differently structured means” than the favorite Cartesian starting place so that individuals might discover, as put forward by Plato in the Theatetus, “different aspects of [their] surroundings.” Therefore, he disabuses the Cartesian “pure” agentive starting point, underscoring deconstruction of its possessive text by asking “why” occidents are inclined to talk that way – he finds it is due to their being accountable to this text which enjoins its own interpretation as a text through prohibition of recourse to socially interpreted relatedness and obligation of “perceptual immediacy.” 2.“Buzzwords”: JS takes the critical/interpretive turn to a didactic extent: if individuality is to make sense against the insensibility of the traditional Story Told, a counter-text must be available to “make common” recognition of corprisocial, hermeneutic and deontical indebtedness to other precursive voices for the active involvement in which situated discourses of individuality are imbued. Therefore, he proffers an ameliorative overcompensation toward the Story Lived; it is an overcompensation, because there is no acknowledgement of purposiveness with regard to physical criteria and consensus; in overstating the internal relation of “known to knower” beyond mere symbiosis, it is not just that the first person cannot stand unrelated to second persons and their textual interpretations, first persons are thoroughly dependent on second persons for providing rhetorical directive and hermeneutic interpretive means (the means of accountable structures) of personal identity.
…George embraces the specificatory altercasting, a difference that makes a Differance
End of Part 2
You and I in Identity and Agency Creation
For those who might be put-off, initially or even ultimately, by the subject matter discussed here, I would refer to that old adage, that “if all you know well is one thing, then you really don’t even know that very well.”
Part 3 of the analysis of
John Shotter’s “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of ‘You” - Part 3
IV. The Unit of Observation viewing persons in relation to one another is Differanced to Observation of Situated Usage; and the Antatylitic unit that is the (first and third) Person and Voice is Differanced to Analysis of Second Persons and Voice
From Social Constructionism’s Observational field constituted of persons in discursive relation relation to one another Observation is moved to the continual activities constituting identity in situations of ordinary language; and against the analytic background of this panorama, the unit of Analysis is changed to examine situated usages of Person and Voice of the verb.
From this stance of Harre’s, i.e., toward the discursive field of everyday moral orders constituted of empirical person positions analyzed as locations in conversation to one another and themselves, JS differs to smaller, more active Units of Observation 1.Continual Commotion – in situations of ordinary language use within the continual commotion of everyday activity, utterances make available pronominal positions on a moment to moment basis. And Analysis 2. Data is as Data Does – Differing from formally analyzed third person panorama of individuality, JS treats data of individuality as nothing outside of the differences of activity. In the momentary transience of these situations of ordinary grammatical use he analyzes what Voice (active or acting into) and Person (1rst, 2nd or 3rd) of the verb are doing.
1.Continual Commotion – Shotter continues the de-reification by using a smaller, more active unit of observation: in situations of ordinary language use within the continual commotion of everyday activity, utterances make available pronominal positions on a moment to moment basis, i.e., make available practically applicable texts of identity. Being as malleable as it is in Social Constructionism, Data are difficult to talk about – data is what data does, and the only certain data is within a language game (L.W.). Deriving Hegel, Pierce, James, Dewey, and post WWII “Ordinary Language Philosophy”, Shotter holds the notion that data of individuality is not something “objective” like empirical geneticism, nor is it subjective experience, it is rather shared ordinary linguistic experience conducted within community standards. In contrast to those who might take a larger frame of analysis, say of the episode, as their preferred unit of observation, examined in terms of “obligation, legitimacy and prohibition”, Shotter uses a smaller unit of time, the moment, and less precise deontic standards – usually how data afford and constrain activity within those moments. Shotter is trying to distinguish an extremely practical, though not especially concrete application of texts of identity within situations of ordinary language use – it is not even so static as Deweyan “intersubjectivity.” More on the order of the Hegelian notion of self and objects emerging together, the self is only as determinate as its objects are – in these relations are a variety of types of consciousness, each of which reflects a different version of reality (Wittgenstein makes a similar point in On Certainty #65) – but away from the Hegelian notion of mediation and its implication of a distance between self and objects and self to itself in an effort to attain complete self knowledge – any sort of individuality is to be characterized as shared and corrigible linguistic activity conducted according to “continually susceptible” (i.e. accountable) personal and cultural history.
In this highly practical focus, he pays particular attention to what goes on between people as first and second persons as they continually coordinate the available resources within the social orders into which they have been socialized. Differing from his previous focus on conjoint creation, he attends here to second person address, how their utterances within given situations constantly articulate the character of the relationship and function to afford and constrain activity in ways appropriate to their momentary positionings. These discursive activities are like mobile regions of occurrence – and since this is not at all like a cognitive or propriotoral, causal, centralistic way of talking, however practical, according to Shotter, this new manner of speech is awkward as it lacks social “currency.” Unlike empiricism, one can neither observe nor do away with these data of involvements, but only authenticate what they do on a moment by moment basis.
2.Data is as Data Does – Rather than the appropriation of a formally analyzed language game of individuality, Shotter differentiates, in the momentary transience of these situations of ordinary language use, the functioning of Voice, whether active or acting-into (passive and possessive forms have little to do with the Story Lived) and Person, whether 1rst, 2nd, or 3rd of the verb. Unlike the static pictures of cognitivism’s first person possessive voice and behaviorism’s third person passive voice, “in situations of ordinary language use, at least, to address a person grammatically is straight-away to say something about what you take their status to be – to address them wrongly has serious practical consequences.” Therefore, we proceed directly to the final consideration –
V. Appropriating Data of individuality as Counting toward accountability and Differancing to accountability as Counting in the Data of individuality
The Social Constructionist data of individuality as praxis in moral orders socially constructed by persons, is differanced to consider data of individuality as they continually reconstruct the deontical grammar of changeable moral rules.
Harré takes this praxis wherein individuality is constructed through rules within relatively stable moral orders arrayed with persons and pronominal positions, and argues for 1. Accountability through individuality – to be accountable, one must be able to conceive of themselves as an agentive individual 2. JS takes a contradictory stance. Individuality is constructed through accountability – individuality is continually reconstructed through deontical grammar of vicissitudinous pronominal positions.
Individuality Through Accountability versus Accountability Through Individuality
Shotter elaborates the view that pronouns function moment to moment to create “intra-linguistically reconstructed positional fields”, giving individuals both structure and means of structure (Benvenistine); they “indicate not only who (1rst, 2nd, 3rd person of the verb) but what (agent or addressee voice) one is at the same time.” The vicissitudinous nature of discursive structuring is resolved by “these mobile signs” which each speaker can “relate to their person…such a knowledge shows itself in the ability to use all pronouns appropriately, as none have sense except in relation to one another – the uses of the I do not in any unitary way refer to what we are.” But their use is far from arbitrary or trivial – second, third, and first persons are assigned different affordances and constraints.
For the most crucial example, the relationship of detached third person passive and voice of behaviorism and positivism fails to acknowledge moral relations among those studied (inasmuch, mischaracterizes the social life that is supposed to be so unaffectedly represented). “They” might not even be considered pain feeling creatures, but an “it.” Further, self reflexive accountability is outside its rules, and outside the rules of the observer. To make up for this culpable social scientistic position, most recent attention has been paid to the agency of personified “I”‘s, “a subject doing something to someone else.” Harré, for example, wants to disabuse the third person stance of empiricism, avowing that “personal identity is symbolic of social practices, not of empirical experiences. It has the status of a theory.”
Accountability through individuality: As Harré (1983) describes events, behaviorism as an attempted positivistic reduction failed and led to cognitivism; this school has held fastly to the positivist dream of an ideal literal minded grammar; as its subpersonal modules lack social criteria, they fail to provide the unified synthesis of individuality – whereas social constructivism moves in the behavioral direction of positivism, leading it unwittingly back into mechanistic coherence and causal necessity. The byproductive ramification in either case is non-accountability. Thus, to render accountability meaningful to corporeal persons, they must be able to conceive of themselves as unitary self reflexive agents. This may be accomplished through possession of a unified theory based on a Gödel-like transcendent notion – an open ended heirarchy of taken for granted grammars.
According to Harré, from the social linguistic realm, corporeal persons – self referential “I’s” (I # 1) – may appropriate and possess an open ended transcendental theory unifying one as a source of linguistic formulations – part of the theory cannot be in conscious attendance, viz., the non- referential I #2, but it can be acted out from and applied according to rights of display; e.g., having their “definienda are referents to concepts of a very high order of sophistication” – the linguistic implication being in accordance to rules of third person relations – “which are properly ‘applied’ only in the dyad or other group created by the symbiotic relationship (p. 106).” This is not meant to besmirch Harre’s opus – I would be an idiot – briefly stated, what Harré accomplishes with the metaphor of “position” is to counteract the non-qualitiative, non-ecological, equalitarian view that all persons perceptual capacities are equally valid. In place of that, Harré brings to the forefront the notion that persons occupy different “positions” in public discursive orders; thus, different positions create moral orders entailing different rights, privileges and obligations. But this metaphor of “public positions” does display a tendency of inquiry which Shotter is trying to redress – Harre’s transformation of the Cartesian dichotomy to a distinction between “public and private” elaborates a pronominal duality – a manner of speaking which tends back to first person possessive mechanism – e.g., “appropriation” from the third person detached observational stance, “theoria”, which he seeks to disavow (as with critique of Harre’s I #1 and I #2). In this effort to wrest individuality from the third person passive of behaviorism, “that’s just the way it is”, what Harre’s unit of analysis, the vestigial first person possessive, is doing is reconstructing its subjective relativism with cognitivism’s artificial remnant of “that’s just my/their preference” (I to I). Therefore, in order to deconstruct the subjectivist relativism of what the I #1 accounting to a sovereign relation to I #2 constructed through the data of individuality appropriated from a detached third person public realm is doing, Shotter takes the data of individuality to be “done”, i.e. constructed in direct and intimate accountability you and I. …in the internally related, Heisenbergian reflexivity of jointly negotiated, you and I.
Individuality through accountability – Shotter takes the data of individuality to count as they continually reconstruct the deontical grammar of pronominal positions. Rather than calling the “I” an open ended theory, he portrays it as a lexically empty concept which blinds individuals to a notion of direct accountability; thus, little is to be said of possessive individuality before it is accountable to the addressivity of specificatory structures which constrain and afford negotiation, shaping and crafting within the continual activity of reconstructing internally related, immanently taken for granted (as opposed to transcendent) depth grammatical rules. That is, individuality is constructed through accountability.
Nevertheless, as the use of language creates and sustains dominant social orders (Mills), we feel of necessity that we must reproduce a scientistic and individual way of talking and thus fail to register our involvement and moral obligations with others; as a result, current conceptions, though supposedly objective, are, in fact, imbued with relativistic subjectivism. Therefore, Shotter moves from Harre’s notion of Appropriation in favor of Differances embedded in communicative activity. As W “makes clear, the retrieval metaphor lacks accountability since we have to assure people and ourselves that our claims are justified, that we can institute checks as to their fittedness to the circumstances in question. Not only is such a process unnecessary, in many instances it is impossible (W 1965:3)” Thus, Shotter does not so much inflect subtle moral orders as he does the fact that we must talk within the requirements of deontical speech genres, the medium of cultural resources within which we live. The dominant speech genre is not to be replaced by appropriating public knowledge to a self theory utilized in accordance with the private subjectivity of the individual – but in the practical social processes going on “between” people – our difference as second persons. In the Story Lived (if lived responsibly) “it does not matter how ‘I” can use language that matters so much as the way in which I must take “you” into account in my use of it; by acting into accepted grammars of specificatory formings within mediums of communication – primarily vague and only partially structured events and states of affairs in the world can be specified further. Such devices or procedures, although of course structured (at least partly), are used not primarily as pictures, as copies, or representations of one’s surroundings. The primary function of language is formative or theoretical, and only secondly and in a derived way referential and representational. It works by people materially moving one another by its use to behave in certain ways.”
Summary: With the notion that data count as praxia of socially constructed rules within relatively stable moral orders, which, in the case of individuality, are arrayed with persons and pronominal positions, Harré (1983) argues for 1. Accountability through individuality – that for accountability to make sense, one must be able to conceive of themselves as an agentive individual – this is accomplished through possession of a unified theory based on a Gödel-like transcendent notion of taken for granted grammar. 2. JS takes a contrary stance: Data count as they continually reconstruct the deontical grammar of pronominal positions. Individuality and agency are constructed through accountability; for this to happen persons must be accountable to act-into the internal relation of Heisenbergian reflexivity, in mutable, immanently taken for granted depth grammars.
Thus, Shotter addresses the relativism inherent in Harre’s appropriation of the enlightenment’s first to third personage accountability of the verb. As the appropriated from occidental text’s first person possessive voice acting toward third person passive voice (behaviorism and cognitivism can be constructed from either grammar) has reconstructed dubious moral orders by transforming recognition from social indebtedness into the objectivist/ subjective – relativist notions of mechanistic coherence [specifically, the relativism of artificial possession (that’s just their/my prerogative”, “god given ability” etc.) and the pseudo objectivity, really, just more relativism, of causal individual necessity – (the “truth of that’s just the way it is”, “natural ability” etc.)] Shotter differences in this article by taking the necessity of how data count away from a picture of the world and into direct putative accountability as second person yous.
CONCLUSION
In this article Shotter has sought to deconstruct The Story Told through the (“the”) Enlightenment text(s) by disabusing its grammatical starting point, the first person possessive. Because accountability to this text reverts practitioners to its inherent blindness to factual and moral indebtedness, to its own textuality, Shotter differances from the rigorous social constructionist emphasis on asking “how” to ask instead “why” not create differently structured means so that individuals might discover different aspects of [their] surroundings in relation to [themselves]? In order to rectify the Enlightenment’s legacy of brutal relativism, he leaves the constructionist fray momentarily for some Platonic “why-ning.” Thus, in lieu of this grammatical emphasis of agency acted out of the first person possessive, he proffers an amelioratively overcompensating counter text toward identity and agency creation in The Story Lived through second person address.
However, as serious consideration of the possessive and detached relational grammar of The Story Told falls outside of JS’s language game, he differences not so much from the Cartesian context, but tacitly makes his actual point of departure from Rom Harre’s thesis of the necessary condition for social construction of the pronoun “I.” That is, the acquisition of capacity for pronominal address. As in most attempts at deconstruction of the traditional text’s grammatical coherence, that is first person possessive “I”, and its detached notion of relation, that is to the third person passive “they”, it has begun with the same first person starting point and has thereby only changed the relational (really non-relational) emphasis from a possessive to a more active voice – a grammatically insufficient emancipation from non-accountable individuality through the Story Told of a-temporality.
Harré and Shotter both seek to rescue individuality and accountability from the inherent ramifications of mechanistic and or automatically causal, behaviorist or cognitive models. The difference in their analysis should be characterized with heuristic sequentiality; each has focused on a different phase in a synthetic process. Harre’s frame is to answer how individuality can be possible – for accountability to make sense, persons must be able to conceive of themselves as conscious, unified agents. By contrast, in this article, Shotter argues that for individuality to make sense, we must first answer why we feel so strongly that there must be a “unitary and total way to refer to what we are.” He argues that it has to do with our accountability to the cultural text we are enmeshed in. Rather than trying to fit an obsolete notion of individuality into The Story Lived, we might do better to change The Story Told. However, since subjective passivity (just as much as mechanical objectivity) is rejected in social constructionism, it falls outside of Shotter’s language game of coherence; for him that grammatical position is taken up in the manner of precursive “addressivity of specificatory structures.” These are discursive logics presented by second persons which, when acted into, provide pre-nominal persons with the means of identifying themselves as first persons. The usage of something like the second person passive voice in his counter text then, is an “acting into” voice. His observations, not having recourse to passivity, thus function mostly beyond his basic purpose of deconstructing the first person points of relationality in terms of the active and acting into discourse between first and second persons. In the performance of this article that takes the form of his “crafting the specificatory structures” of Harre’s “addressive” text, “Personal Being”, shaping away some traditional stylisms and crafting some of his hypotheses of necessary relatedness.
This has been primarily a descriptive piece. Shotter maintains the coherent theme of activity, the awkward logic of second person involvement, etc. All technical aspects are exquisite, and Shotter’s purpose remedial – if it were not primarily so, I would be concerned to assert that a life lived rigorously through texts of second person accountability might be a neurotic affair of the most strangely labyrinthic entanglements. I would agree that indeed physical being’s significance must be learned within the pre-eminent social context; but while I may offer assent that Shotter’s language game does not move so rapidly to the radical extreme that Gergen (1991, p. 156) has taken of dissolving the “I” into a collective “Us”, the momentary unit of individuality does, nevertheless, head toward behaviorism by not sufficiently unifying and marshaling longer-term individual language intentionality (Although in fairness to Shotter, it must be said that in his pentadic survey, he is careful to note accountability to historical, familial and genetic predecessors). While addressivity (like the notion of altercasting) does represent a narrative improvement over the Lockeatinism of Cissna and Sieberg’s confirmation research, it does not address the kinds of stability and complexity of various, simultaneously functioning narratives, its theoria outlook neglecting terms of the multi-interactive qualities of poesis and phronesis in contextings. But beyond the question that in moving toward the end of fully relational selves – do I’s risk trivializing a critical non-idealist aspect of corporeality (?) – the sensibility of depending upon altercasting, still worse, confirmation, to allay venal constraint compares dubiously to the assertion of even a fairly gleaned language of propriotorial significance and a unified language game of intentionality. Shotter depicts circumstances necessitating an imaginary “you”, but it is the “I” in these situations which marshals the important task of coherence. Taking that fact to the practicality of the more pervasive conventions within a given life form, not all “yous” will be addressed with esteemed or even useful specifications, if barely at all. Similarly, while ordinary language has had and will continue to have many emancipating uses, it also runs the risk of heading discourse toward a Lockeatine type realism (“don’t use fancy words with me, I just want the straight facts”). In another theoretical framework, the matter might be subsumed within a new overview – grammars of the Cartesian paradigm itself treated as one natural facet, internally related (albeit unwittingly) to alternative moralities – wherever a possible criteria for evaluating these orders, there must be a unified grammar, which, at least by analogy, can coordinate talk among them. That is to say, we might subsume the difference between Shotter’s stronger concern for the consequences of Cognitive style self reflexivity and Harre’s stronger concern for the ramifications of Behaviorist enmeshment within a new language game – and like Harré, approximate flow between polarities.
Sources:
1. Harré, R. (1983) Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
2. Shotter, J. and Gergen K.J. (1989) Texts of Identity – Inquiries in Social Constructionism Series, v 2 Sage Publications Ltd. London.
Martin Buber’s “I and Thou” apparently played a part in this discourse; though I had not not read it until after this was written.
Footnotes:
{1} Constructionism – like Constructivism insist the social world is made, but Constructionism goes farther to insist that the social world is made real, not just made-up in those activities – by focusing on the process by which social worlds are made as opposed to focusing on institutions, that is the products of those practices (which is the focus even, of most social constructionst approaches). Moreover, the emphasis on the significance of rules is one of the points which removes it from the behaviorism of the constructivist approach.
{2} Harré, in a 1993 address (wherein he quipped that “the mind is a four letter word and it shouldn’t be used”) marked a distinction between the first and second cognitive school. The first cognitive school, as elaborated in institutions such as M.I.T., has sought to establish an objective map of the human mind and its functions. Harré argued that this amounts to a formal language game about a language game (they are drawing maps of maps) and not a model of the “mind.” In what he designated the second cognitive school, a discursive approach prevails – cognitive activity would be of the private, intrapersonal use of publicly acquired interpersonal discourse. Shotter may have a point that there is still too much residual of the first cognitivism in Harre’s argument.
{3} Frequent usages are (see as listed in Part 1)
{4} For more news of “difference”Harré (1993) states that one cannot know molecules (the only a-priori extant besides people in discourse) outside of what they are doing.”
{5} In order to facilitate the English middle class participation in equal education to the Aristocracy, Locke did away with the notion of “class” in favor of an empirical notion of “individual rights”; there was no “class.” That was not sensibly empirical. There was nothing besides sensory perceptions which got “stamped” onto the brain and formed into “associations” by the “individual.” One person’s sense impressions, being of equal source, were just as valid as another’s. Therefore, they should have equal individual “rights” (Hannah Arendt held this enlightenment text to be “far from innocent.”). It would seem to me that this kind of “positivism” would have a prejudicial bias very much favoring the quantification of those individuals not so disposed to recognizing need for others – the powerful, the demoralized, sociopaths, etc.
Social Constructionism contends that there is no such thing as an individual apart from interactivity with others in situated circumstances as mediated through language. Further, as opposed to the neutrality of “perceptions”, persons will be in different “positions” in moral discursive orders, giving them unequal skill and knowledge. As mentioned in this article, maintaining the fallacy of individual sovereignty calls for rational blindness to factual and deontical indebtedness to others. Accountability to this text constructs the moral void of subjective relativism (that’s just my, or their, preference – its moral ramifications of artificial possession, paranoia and the revenge of deprivation or great loss) and pseudo objectivism (that’s just the way it is – as the elements of behavior are detached from social creation there is no responsibility for their ramifications). In either case, whether empirical or transcendent, activity is treated as being beyond the negotiated social construction of rules.
In my initial writing of this article, I neglected to articulate the critical reason why Harré uses the position metaphor – i.e., to counteract the Lockeatine notion of personal immediacy, its empirical skepticism of differing abilities, that the judgments of some will be better than others due to their position.
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Posted by DanielS on Sun, 05 Jan 2014 02:18 | #
From wikipedia
“Ethogenics is an interdisciplinary social scientific approach that attempts to understand the systems of belief or means through which individuals attach significance to their actions and form their identities by linking these to the larger structure of rules (norms) and cultural resources in society. For Rom Harré, the founder of ethogenics, it represents a radical innovation in traditional psychology, even a completely “new psychology” that should take its place. (Harré et al., 1985: 129).
Ethogenic Theories
Ethogenicists argue that the unified self (or ‘I’) emerges through everyday discourse and is enabled through metaphors. Rom Harré states:
All that is personal in our mental and emotional lives is individually appropriated from the conversation going on around us and perhaps idiosyncratically transformed. The structure of our thinking and our feeling will reflect, in various ways, the form and content of that conversation. The main thesis of this work is that mind is no sort of entity, but a system of beliefs structured by a cluster of grammatical models. The science of psychology must be reformed accordingly (1983: 20).
Methodologically, ethogenics starts with the social formation as the primary human reality and then shows how the human self exists within it via personally modified ‘templates.’(Harré 1983: 64-65). While Harré makes a distinction between personal and social being, he does not claim that personal being is prior to social being.
By contrast, John Shotter’s approach to ethogenics analyzes social action with others (as opposed to individual rule-following and performances), which is said to give individuals ‘social powers.’ There is no cognitive structure of the social self independent of social context (Shotter 1983: 33). Therefore, Shotter emphasizes the practical necessities which bring individuals together in moral configurations, which it is necessary to hermeneutically approach. Shotter believes this is a better way to understand the “accounting practices” (and resulting consciousness) of individuals than Harré‘s methods.”
The Specificatory Structure as Opposed to The Car Engine
Specificatory Structures (are topoi to be shaped and crafted as collaborative, working hypotheses in praxis, finally leading to operational verifiabilty) as opposed to a universal model of “the mind” proposed to function like a car engine (talk about a “clunky idea” or not).
I was about to put up a video by The Golden One in which he expresses gratitude to the Dalai Lama for voicing his authoritative support of European ethnonationalims – “Europe belongs to the European peoples and immigrants should return and rebuild their countries.”
But then I hear him saying that “the Dalai Lama is a spiritual man and is not beholden to ‘social rules” which our elite try to brow beat us with….I realize they’re at it again, that I cannot just suck it up in sympathy for the bad Swedish election; as I did in posting his last video, in which The Golden One calls the enemies “leftists.” There are still retarded people playing opposite day with me behind the scenes – encouraging misconceptions like “social rules” are Not somehow also a neutral analytic device (which of course they are) but singularly a tool of coercion for our enemies; whereas a rigorous adherence to “nature” without all that “sociology, communicolgical, White post modern stuff” will inevitably ensure our “rights” and “ethnonationalism.”
This is completely retarded and backwards. Nature doesn’t give us our rights, nature doesn’t give a shit about our rights and our ehtnonationalisms. We have rights because we are part of a community of people with relative group interests – in best unit, a union of discrete European ethnonations, in which we create and negotiate rights by consensus, not foolishly believing that we discover them in objective detachment.
As I have said before, The White Post Modern Project is a necessity in response to the ravages of Modernity and the inflexibility of Reactionary Traditionalism. …and it (White Post Modernity) is particularly a necessity to hold up to the destruction of ethnonationalism that post modern conception is supposed to defend against, but rather destroys in YKW misrepresentation of the notions they’ve promoted as “post modernity.”
The project, including Heidegger’s, is not to make humans and society function like automatons, like a car engine, on an engineering and physics model – not in that model of “theoria” as Aristotle calls it, but to take our concerns even for the hard sciences, but especially for the social sciences into the realm of praxis – again, as Aristotle calls it – the social realm of people, where they have some agency, and are therefore not totally predictable; where we are biological creatures and mammals, evolved to care about important relationships to our survival and in optimal, not maximal levels of need satisfaction; where we are biological creatures and our actions have reflexive effects that cause changes in course in ourselves and others; where, as second order cybernetic creatures we can learn to learn. The project, including Heidegger’s (where on target and not too individualistic in his focus), The White Post Modern Project, is to take our thinking into praxis to correct the Cartesian detached and lineal, non-interactive notion of necessity – imperviously abetting, as it does, the phony and crooked disease of quantification to the point of false comparison, toxicity and runaway; typically by means of the Charmed Loop of Didactic Incitement.
To correct the Cartesian error of modernity, we need Not a “model of the mind” as tightly connected as a Porsche car engine to the exclusion of all else (to defend ourselves against all that Jewish social stuff) …no, what we need is a better understanding of the utility and integrity of Specificatory Structures to negotiate the participatory reality of Praxis. Specificatory Structures are basically partly or nearly finished working hypotheses as it were, that allow interlocutors to engage, shape, craft, correct and refine these hypotheses.
Remember, the ultimate aim of pragmatic philosophy is the rigor of operational verifiability. So, those with a penchant for engineering and scientific rigor should be satisfied; while being helped to Not promote the scientism and epistemic blunder of applying physics models (theoria) to creatura and social group concerns (praxis).
Nor does social constructionism (proper) and hermeneutics deny science, biological realty or race; it enhances and complements scientific inquiry, it does not discourage science: it may criticize bad science (“we are all Africans under the skin”) and bad applications of science – physics and brute animal models to humans and our world of praxis (“its all about competition, survival of the fittest, might makes right and nothing more”) – but it is not anti-science.
If GW or somebody comes up with specs, which generally track “the transit” of English and European (natural) social systems, well and good. What hermeneutics proper would do is not deny it, but refer back to it as need be in the course of operational verification.
What I am saying is true, of radical and deep priority for our European interests; but “opposite day” is still being played with me.
I will speculate as to why:
First is obvious – YKW know what I am saying is true, want to discourage it and direct Whites to join them as right wing reactionaries.
The second is right wingers – people who are lucky enough to be in position to take care of themselves, don’t feel need to care about the group as a whole – they sell our groups out.
There is a third and fourth category at work, also right wing reactionary. The Jesus freak contingent I’ve said enough about – if people can’t see the plain fact that Christianity is a Jewish trick, then how much time are you supposed to waste on them? Rather you have to defend against the worm they’d insist upon introducing. But among right wing reactionaries that are a problem for me are STEM people who are not penetrating enough philosophically to get beyond their STEM predilections – which, again, would have them perpetrate the epistemic blunder of applying theoria to praxis – which, rather, requires phronesis (practical judgement of the kind that the topoi of specificatory structures would guide). By contrast, the whole “Dark Enlightenment” crap is a psy-op set up by our (((enemies))) and advanced by operatives like Brett Stevens in order to misdirect and (((boondoggle))) STEM types.
These types are not only prone to this type of epistemic blunder, but have some enhanced confirmation bias as the harder matters that they’ve tended to look into are more stable and veifiable than the social world where Jewish rhetoric has wreaked havoc. Thus, their Cartesian anxiety is calmed somewhat by their concrete successes in engineering and business in boom times; say, during the Reagan/Thatcher objectivist sell-out years, in their reactionary quest for “foundations” in nature beyond human tampering.
Moreover, these sorts have had a big leg up in advancing the epistemic blunder in their predilection when coming into the Internet age – for obvious reasons – computer technology is a STEM field mostly about the tight, non-human, electric/mechanical connections of theoria. While those more sympathetic to a White take on social, communicological, post modern, hermeneutic resource have been late bringing it to the table.
All the while the YKW have been doing their number, taking the best ideas for social advocacy for themselves then distorting them, abusing them and weaponizing them against Whites – to where Whites react and play opposite day with me, as if I am the bad guy simply for using our words, terms and concepts properly in our interests; Whites have such heavy reactions to the negative, red cape associations they feel from these words that they react against the abused words and concepts; and in so doing rebel against their own interests, in what one cannot help but believe is a (((deliberate strategy.)))
“We can’t defend ‘racism’, people wouldn’t understand (that the term is fundamentally about social classification and ethnocentrism), so we have to argue against it (and weaken the call of social classification and ethnocentrism).” “We must be against Multiculturalism (and for global monoculturalism)” ….“we must be against the Diversity industry (and for racial integration through Abrahamic/Noahide law, or ‘universal natural law’).”
“I only trust my own mind” …“we need a science of the mind” …well go ahead… maybe that is a good perspective for holding fast to inquiries into emergentism. I’m not stopping you, but we also need, need even more inquiries from the communications perspective – taking interaction as the unit of analysis, claiming the same turf as other disciplines when taking-on investigations: whether the group (sociology – most relevant, because races are groups); philosophy (inquiries into how to live and think about life); or biology and interacting ecosystems …and alas, even psychology.
And so we’ve had a problem, as manifest acutely on Majorityrights, where the STEM people clamored here early. The site’s discourse model has been strictly Modernist – a free speech free-for-all with the errant notion that if you just keep allowing issues to be buffeted from all angles, eventually the foundational truth would be born again hard from this torturous alchemy.
Of course, that’s not what happens. Modernity is an insatiable charmed loop that has run rough shod over even our most precious resources, putting them at needless risk in the sheer objectivism of scentistic experimentalism; if something is not “new” it no longer merits reverence for the modernist thinker.
…and in come the trolls, the Jews, and Jew tools, like Haller and Thorn, whose backers know this and took advantage to sew misdirection in MR’s threads under the guise of “free speech” and inquiry into discovery of “the truth.”
The obnoxous “Uh”, who also displayed affinity, argued for the inclusion of the YKW and clearly does not take these matters of White advocacy most seriously, but wants a place to vent his spleen against those who had the nerve to go to college, so he can show how ‘smart’ he is… the fetish of MR in the modernist times has been ‘the one line zinger”, as Uh was so fond of… Soren et. al are other STEM people into that as well…
Sublime engineering is the model…there is just that one little precise thing, said in perfect rigor which will either bring the whole edifice down or make it hum like the best car engine ever …the streak of incisive brilliance like a sheen, gleaming like a “classic sparkle.”
… claims I ruined all this fun for him ….
But it stems rather from a misunderstanding of the Specificatory Structure and its aim – its aim is to provide social topoi for people to participate, shape, craft and refine …indeed, in rigor, as required in the post modern circumstance, to reach Operational Verifiability – that is the end point of the process of pragmatic inquiry – so the STEM-heads should not object and are only displaying just how reactionary (or dishonest) they are when they object to the terms and concepts that I set out.
Brilliant though he is, indispensable ideas though he’s contributed, even Bowery was bewilderingly reactionary in this regard, acting like I was attacking science when I criticized the bad science and misapplication of science that is scientism. …or that I was besmirching science when I set out the place and general errors of the empirical philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume (I presumed that everyone knows that you are talking about them when criticizing “empirical philosophy”) in historical context of epochal bias. I knew we were in trouble when Bowery simply ignored what I said, angrily tried to prohibit me from criticizing Modernity, Cartesianism (the quest to separate mind from interaction, viz. interactive stasis, outer systemic homeostasis) and proposed to “reboot the enlightenment.”
But the fact is that we have to move beyond modernity to White Post Modernity if we are to save ourselves and not be a part of human ecological destruction.
It is for this reason that I will introduce an update – not removing the present “About” information for Majorityrights – but add the Post Modern fact that “Hello’, we have the Internet now,” you can interact and help to shape and craft our necessary knowledge. We are no longer beholden to the transmissions model of communication, in which we sat in front of televisions, or teachers, or preachers and were to receive the information as pure, sacrosanct, passive, no need for our input and correction….
What you are presented with at Majorityrights are specificatory structures – hypotheses well enough considered, with a likely trajectory to protect our interests as discreet European peoples; but we can always use help from honest people of good will, to shape, craft and verify our inquiries where not proposing inquiries anew.
Articles are not put up as if by Moses presenting the ten commandments; nor presented as if the author thinks, in hubris, that these are immutable, always perfect ideas and objects; as if we think this is something like a sublime car engine, when it really isn’t, and what is necessary is for you to humble us, mock, in ad hominum attack. No. These are specificatory structures presented with a good deal more humility and social respect – your interaction, your help in participating in the generation of knowledge production is most appreciated.
There is also a fifth unfortunate fact that we are up against a huge Irish/German demographic in America which, for reasons I’ve described, are prone to take the disposition that Hitler was simply right and needs to be redeemed – and there are White advocates of bad character, like David Duke, who will pander to that.
Because we are White Post Modern now, certain inquires are recognized as a distraction at best and all too often pernicious misdirection: Jewish participation; Christianity; Nazi redemption; obviously nutty conspiracy theories; and when we have time to explain with subtlety, scientism and other errors held over from the modernist apex.
And if someone doesn’t like it – “wha! wha! I want ‘my’ Majoritrights back! – I want Jesus! I want Hitler! I want to kiss the ass of rigid Nordicism as opposed to ethnonationalism (which, among other European kinds, defends Nordics as such)! I want to trade ‘clever’ one line zingers with Uh!” – he can go grease up and get another tattoo on his neck.
Comments:
Posted by DanielS on Fri, 14 Sep 2018 16:15 | #
On today’s “Stormfront” podcast, Don Black reiterates the David Duke line on how to respond to the term, “racism.”
Black says that “racism” is a made-up Jewish term (Trotsky) and we shouldn’t use their terminology; that he (like Duke) used to say “it depends upon how you define racism?”…..
But now Black just prefers to say, ‘oh, you’re just saying that because you are anti-White.’
This is a strawman argument that Black and Duke are using, because I am not asking, “it depends upon how you define racism?”
I am observing that there is ALWAYS inherent in the term, the function of social classification.
….whether one merely discriminates on its basis or whether one wants to lord over other social classifications as a supremacist.
Nevertheless, social classification is a necessary function of making sense of the world and of accountability. Thus the charge is illegitimate (Cartesian, etc.). To say that you are not a racist is to cede to the YKW the prohibition of social classification.
Social classification, the negotiation of which, is central to our cause of racial defense.
As I’ve said, Duke is theoretically inept.
Duke says, “you don’t change the conditioning of what people understand of the term.” …you don’t exchange it easily, as there is commonly accepted currency and wisdom in ordinary language – beneath the term racism, social classification is pervasive in ordinary language. And the prohibition needs to be drawn out for the absurdity that it is.
To use Whitaker’s line that ‘you’re just saying that because you are anti-White’ will be fine sometimes. But it is just another way of problematizing the delegitimization of social classification, which needs to be done more explicitly and deftly in common parlance.
I like to say “anti-racisim is anti-social classification; it is Cartesian. It is not innocent, it is prejudice, it is hurting and it is killing people.”
Posted by stasis correction on Sat, 15 Sep 2018 03:51 | #
I should probably add when criticizing things as “Cartesian”, that Cartesianism expresses an anxiety to quest beyond interaction but more pertinently, beyond the interaction of stasis correction and homeostasis correction (homeostasis regarding the external system) DanielS
Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 10:45 | #
Daniel: If GW or somebody comes up with specs, which generally track “the transit” of English and European (natural) social systems, well and good …
I have said that I am not now interested in political practise, as you are. I am interested in foundation, which you aren’t. However …
Having addressed the fundamentals in Division One of Being and Time, Martin Heidegger commences upon practical interpretation in Division Two. At the outset of Chapter 2 he writes (of The problem of How an Authentic Existentiell Possibility is Attested):
The question of the “who” of Dasein has been answered with the expression ‘Self’. Dasein’s Selfhood has been defined formally as a way of existing, and therefore not as an entity present-at-hand. For the most part I myself am not the “who” of Dasein; the “theyself” is its who. Authentic Being-one’s-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of the “they”; and this modification must be defined existentially. What does this modification imply, and what are the ontological conditions for its possibility.
So here Heidegger is setting out the the basics of the transit, recognising the socialised entity which does not belong to Dasein, and stating that a certain change in and around it must be effected for authenticity in the lived life to become possible. This already accepts that, as thrown beings, we cannot ordinarily be other than lost to our own truth … that this is an existential condition and other conditions for existence attend the possibility of “modification” – modification, mind, not the inflation of a mystical liberation or enlightenment. This is not an argument for a common life of saints and seers and mystics. This is an argument for a small but, obviously, seminal change to the general conditions of existence which ushers in (or in my scheme of the transit, turns us towards) the possibility of the authentic as a response to lostness – which conditions must then be conserved in the lived-life thereafter.
In that sense, then, Heidegger goes on to address the sequence as “modification” then conserving “rules”. He is saying that without modification “the they” will unfailingly account for rule-making. He is placing thinking like yours beyond the matter immediately at hand, thus:
With Dasein’s lostness in the “they”, that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon. The “they” has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of Being. The “they” even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has ‘really’ done the choosing. So Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the “they”.
So that ties matters together, and provides for a place of work for both of us.
Posted by DanielS on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 15:44 | #
Note that when I talk about Aristotle’s philosophy and Heidegger’s work on the project, I do not call it “politics”, but refer to it rather as philosophy.
…and when you say that I am ‘not interested’ in foundations, it is more the case that (better) philosophy is concerned to move us into categories of process, engagement and relevance of implementation.
Thus, what you call “foundations”, I would still call specificatory structures (or check points).
The matter of ‘how things count’ for us still holds relevance even regarding the periodic chart of the elements.
Call what you are pursuing “foundations” if you insist, but please refrain from calling philosophy, proper philosophy, “politics”, as if mere politics.
Some right-wingers, like those over there at Strormfront may never learn. I turned on the show for three minutes …“oh, ho ho ho, they say race is just a social construct, that there is no biological basis….that there are 57 genders”….
Still reacting against the didactic Jewish abuse of concepts and red-caping.
Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:34 | #
In the very broadest of terms, there is a philosophy of existence, and there is a philosophy of change. The first is not, and cannot be, political, but is perennial and resolute, and affords a certain rooted and a-historical understanding to the second. In turn, that second is given over in its entirety to the historical process. Its destiny is to make human history. It can, of course, be political, and indeed it flows readily into politics in consequence of its vast multiplicity of teleological and perspectival potentials, and because it is anyway very nearly a philosophy of human agency and diurnal power. You should not baulk at my description of it as politics. I am making the distinction between it and the foundational nature of what necessarily precedes it.
How (not whether) the preceding philosophy meshes with it is really the point at issue between us. There is a baton to be passed out from the realm of the existent … something emergent and life-affirming, and causal. The political cannot go back and make that act of passing to itself, which I feel is what you want to do. It is proper that the political has its eyes fixed firmly ahead.
Posted by DanielS on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:53 | #
The political cannot go back and make that act of passing to itself, which I feel is what you want to do. It is proper that the political has its eyes fixed firmly ahead.
I do not want to change our nature. That is a right-wing stereotype of “what ‘leftists’ do.”
Rather, I am staving off the misguiding, confused and tangled rules and re-directing the way to reconstruction of our systemics, in homeostasis.
The baton is passed back and forth from broader perspective and imagination to rigor and closer readings and from closer readings to broader perspectives.
My concerns are not born ex-nihilo, free of biological and natural concern.
I do not object to closer readings. Calibration to feedback for another metaphor. I already take the baton of our haplogroups, which are close readings. …this does not make redundant the careful description of ontology and its transit process that you wish to bring forth.
Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 18:58 | #
Nothing goes back and forth. Hermeneutics is an intellectual conceit. The power which connects the existential with the political is attention.
Posted by DanielS on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 20:35 | #
Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 19:58 | #Nothing goes back and forth. Hermeneutics is an intellectual conceit. The power which connects the existential with the political is attention.
Wrong again. Tacking back and forth is as natural as it gets. A pulse. Breathing. Heart-beating. Any sort of survey. Looking both ways before crossing the street. Calibration and feedback. From the broad hypothesis to focus on particular detail….from imagination to rigor…
The balancing of systems as they move into a space…
You are trying to take advantage of the fact that it can go back and forth by suggesting that it, hermenetuics must, in an arbitrary and mechanical way, go back and forth in its survey. Rather it can facilitate, weave and integrate coherent attention in a way that the mere presentation of empirical data cannot, moving back and picking up historical data, as need be, as is comfortable, into the historical, into heretofore hidden parts of the system, into various perspectives and biographies, etc., once gain precisely because it is ensconced in the social realm, long after an initial episode of individual attention has lapsed.
Remember what Graham said about hermeneutics – that the best scientists are hermeneuticists: undoubtedly true.
Hermeneutics is not an intellectual conceit. Its a perfectly natural and eminently sufficient means of survey and inquiry. It provides orientation and helps to guide focus. It provides for coherence, accountability, agency and warrant – not only to individuals, but to our group systemic homeostasis.
Still up to your old tricks. If something is very important to our systemic requirements, if its very good, you will be in the way trying to destroy it. It goes to your resentment that good ideas could have passed through academia and that all that is necessary is NOT in your armchair. The true conceit is pursuit of universal foundations that are supposed to make everything else, including one of Heidegger’s most important contributions – hermeneutics – unimportant.
Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 21:12 | #
I am not wrong. You simply lack understanding of the process at hand, and so you make a category error conflating a practical re-turn … a journey of the consciousness of a people … with the pointless academic babbling of hermeneutics.
Posted by DanielS on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 23:37 | #
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Posted by Guessedworker on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 22:12 | #I am not wrong. You simply lack understanding of the process at hand, and so you make a category error conflating a practical re-turn … a journey of the consciousness of a people … with the pointless academic babbling of hermeneutics.
Yes, you are wrong. I make no category error. It’s called a co-evolutionary process. “The consciousness of a people” is but one story (psychobabble if there ever was), while hermeneutics in total is crucial for our peoples to manage their coherence, accountability, agency and warrant.
Posted by Captainchaos on Tue, 18 Sep 2018 02:38 | #
Daniel, does it make you buttsore to know that most people think your sperging is a retarded joke?
Posted by DanielS on Tue, 18 Sep 2018 04:40 | #
You don’t know most people. You circulate among (((Alt-Right))) people and those fixated on Hitler redemption (so, of course they are going to be taking a pejorative view of my offerings). “Sperging” is one among the tired and limited (((Alt-Right))) repertoire of terms that you don’t seem to have imagination enough to exchange. Ask experts on philosophy and on Heidegger in particular and they agree with me, that hermeneutics is essential and pivotal to his/the anti-Cartesian, post modern turn.
Their confirmation counts more than alt-righty folks, the ‘original thinker’ Carolyn Yeager (lol) and so on. So, no, I’m not “butthurt.”
Posted by danielj on Thu, 20 Sep 2018 03:13 | #
Hey y’all.
I’d really appreciate it if you took this down and removed my name and photographs. Please change the name to danielj at the very least.
Regards,
d
Posted by danielj on Thu, 20 Sep 2018 03:15 | #
took this down *or* removed my name and photographs
Posted by Guessedworker on Thu, 04 Oct 2018 15:19 | #
“Coherence, accountability, agency and warrant”
All this comes with the generalisation of that process which nationalists term “awakening” (not a hermeneutic process, btw), and I would include under the rubric of emergence. For example, in the ancient racial hearth of Europe, at least, “coherence” requires no managing. Its real name is kinship, and in that name it speaks quite naturally and of its own accord, perhaps even concord. Likewise “accountability” becomes coherent through kin-recognition and the completely natural, conscious loyalty which travels in its folds. “Agency” … the power to do … is a characteristic and strict outcome of the appropriated life. I don’t use the word myself (preferring singularity), but it is easy to see that unity is the optimum condition under which the capacity to do is found, and disunity the worst. Lastly, “warrant” has no truer or higher assenting authority than the natural and sovereign identity of the kin-group. I do believe, were I to ask you whose authority you are seeking, you would struggle to find an answer at all, even a wrong one.
This is not to say that the emergent requires no collaborative or organisational structure for its politics, law, and so on. But, as I have commented just recently, emergence itself is necessarily a penetration into the prior general life. Nothing from that life goes back to inform or engender it. Not even reaction to a daily injustice has that power. A creative philosophy alone has it.
Posted by DanielS on Thu, 04 Oct 2018 19:53 | #
Consolidating prior responses into one comment:
Posted by Guessedworker on Thu, 04 Oct 2018 10:19 | #
“Coherence, accountability, agency and warrant”
All this comes with the generalisation of that process which nationalists term “awakening” (not a hermeneutic process, btw), and I would include under the rubric of emergence
Of course it (awakening) comes with hermeneutics, it is part and parcel of consciousness of these things – part and parcel of emergence even. Be true to emergence dictum of non-reductionism!
For example, in the ancient racial hearth of Europe, at least, “coherence” requires no managing.
If you wanted to maintain distinct European tribes, it did.
And if you wanted to maintain coherence against the Muslim invasions, it did.
Its real name is kinship, and in that name it speaks quite naturally and of its own accord, perhaps even concord. Likewise “accountability” becomes coherent through kin-recognition and the completely natural, conscious loyalty which travels in its folds.
I didn’t say that it is not natural, and that accountability, like everything else, isn’t a part of nature, but emergent qualities are not to be reduced as you would like, in what you call your “ontologic philosophy,” which is primarily a vain effort to try to render me and what I say as unimportant, as the academic nemesis of your autobiographical conceit.
Accountability for differentiation among differentiated Europeans is no less a matter of sheer nature any more than it is for a teenager to speak our European language if he’s been kept isolated and never learned to speak a language as child. It is not simply emergent in his nature – rather the emergent includes the extended genotype.
“Agency” … the power to do … is a characteristic and strict outcome of the appropriated life.
Not necessarily, there is appropriation but there is also acting-into.
I don’t use the word myself (preferring singularity), but it is easy to see that unity is the optimum condition under which the capacity to do is found, and disunity the worst.
Your motive is understandable. It would be roughly the opposite of Bowery’s. While he would want to promote the freedom to extricate himself from alien populations surrounding him in The US, you would want to speak in language that emphaisizes a lack of agency to depart from your people, that “there can be no other,” in order to underscore loyalty to people and land.
The problem for you there, is that that is not exactly true for people that “they can do no other”. Although the bigger problem is once again that you unnecessarily see mutual exclusivity. Agency is not necessarily the enemy of loyalty, fidelity and authentic emergence, especially not when coupled with consideration of accountability, coherence and warrant. You may as well make the best of unavoidable facts, and put agency on your side.
I don’t think it was a coincidence that Shotter, an Englishman, was concerned to examine these matters by contrast to an alternative of “anything goes.”
Lastly, “warrant” has no truer or higher assenting authority than the natural and sovereign identity of the kin-group.
I do believe, were I to ask you whose authority you are seeking, you would struggle to find an answer at all, even a wrong one.
Not really. I would usually say something quite similar as in your first sentence (although “no truer”, I would not say – I’d say it would tend to provide sound working hypotheses in their ordinary language) although warrant can be established by means of the additional confirmation of other groups; or persons of distinguished authority – for example those skilled in verification by scientific proof.
So much for your doubt.
This is not to say that the emergent requires no collaborative or organisational structure for its politics, law, and so on.
As I have said, these things would even be a part of emergence.
But, as I have commented just recently, emergence itself is necessarily a penetration into the prior general life.
You can look into pre-linguistic structures, and try to identify where they might tend to align with ethnonatioanalist trajectory.
But one mistake you continually make when you pretend that you are doing a favor – “clearing away” – the language that I use, is that you are not clearing away authenticity at all, you are relying on strawmen – invariably, which is obfuscation.
Nothing from that life goes back to inform or engender it.
It is a circular process indeed where encouraged properly, as opposed to the diarrhea that you propose as revelation.
Not even reaction to a daily injustice has that power. A creative philosophy alone has it.
Well, that’s why it’s good that we have me here, so that there is at least one creative philosophy as opposed to your jealous denial and obfuscating bullshit.
Posted by Captainchaos on Thu, 04 Oct 2018 20:47 | #
GW has had a gas chamber built in the basement of his house. The next step is to lure Daniel over there.
Posted by Guessedworker on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 16:28 | #
As a method of interpretation, hermeneutics is a discipline of active intellectual reflection … a species of the directed process of “thinking-about” in the abstract. It belongs solely to the intellectual function of Mind. Academics invariably and uncritically assume that (a) intellect is the sovereign principle, and (b) logical structure yields an objective verity that the inchoate functions of Mind are constitutionally incapable of delivering. Although Heidegger is also at fault in this, as his hermeneutical fixation attests, he makes amends by theorising essential thinking (but still only as “thinking”, of course).
Well, remember the large, hungry brown bear circling while the intellectual, out for his morning constitutional in the woods, dryly adumbrates. Beside him the gamekeeper, an unkempt emotionalist, knows only an urgent must, and clicks off the safety on his shotgun. We could say that in terms of participating mind-function the essential is properly an holistic and combinative operation of two or more of the brains perceptual systems. Compared to its opposite … calculative thinking … it is nearer by orders of magnitude to that clarity and spontaneity which is optimal for there-being as the site or act or state of the witness to Being’s disclosure. That very nearness is human presence. This is what you are describing as reductive.
Mind you, that makes a change from “Cartesian”. Or “epistemological error”.
Posted by DanielS on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 19:40 | #
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Posted by Guessedworker on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 11:28 | #As a method of interpretation, hermeneutics is a discipline of active intellectual reflection … a species of the directed process of “thinking-about” in the abstract. It belongs solely to the intellectual function of Mind.
No. It is an engaged process that does have some interpretation at one end but has engagement, acting into, and verification at the other end.
Typically, you completely misunderstand.
Academics invariably and uncritically assume that (a) intellect is the sovereign principle, and (b) logical structure yields an objective verity that the inchoate functions of Mind are constitutionally incapable of delivering.
You haven’t been paying attention to what I’m saying and you are remaining in your retarded war against academia that causes you to misrepresent everything with straw men. You are not “clearing away” and “preparing the ground” with your straw men, but rather are obfuscating it.
Although Heidegger is also at fault in this, as his hermeneutical fixation attests, he makes amends by theorising essential thinking (but still only as “thinking”, of course).
He is not at fault in picking up hermeneutics from his forebears, he is taking a necessary method for managing coherence against the propositional Cartesian divide.
Well, remember the large, hungry brown bear circling while the intellectual, out for his morning constitutional in the woods, dryly adumbrates.
I’ve addressed this dozens of times, even in comments within the past few days (your runaway train example).
From the endowment that we have – which can be looked upon as a social construct of our parents and forebears – we have some innate responses to the bear. We are even better equipped if we have the social construct of a high power rifle, bear spray, training in animal behavior… and good story telling capacity to entertain people with afterward in tales about the event.
Beside him the gamekeeper, an unkempt emotionalist, knows only an urgent must, and clicks off the safety on his shotgun.
The shotgun is surely purely natural ..or should we clear it away for your pure ontology?
We could say that in terms of participating mind-function the essential is properly an holistic and combinative operation of two or more of the brains perceptual systems. Compared to its opposite … calculative thinking … it is nearer by orders of magnitude to that clarity and spontaneity which is optimal for there-being as the site or act or state of the witness to Being’s disclosure. That very nearness is human presence. This is what you are describing as reductive.
No, I am not reductive. But you are. What we are experiencing now is your pathological contentiousness – a wish to render all perceived academic contributions trivial and useless by comparison to the shit that you spew.
Mind you, that makes a change from “Cartesian”. Or “epistemological error”
The engaged process of reaction to the bear is not a Cartesian or empistemologial error; your understanding of it is.
Finally, GW: don’t you think it’s a bit arbitrary that all you ever do is try to find some way to disagree with something that I say?
Quite the opposite of what I should be able to expect.
Posted by Guessedworker on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 21:34 | #
Typically, you completely misunderstand.
It happens as thought. Only thought. Therefore you are wrong.
From the endowment that we have – which can be looked upon as a social construct of our parents and forebears – we have some innate responses to the bear.
You are effectively retailing Marxist nonsense. Adaptive traits are not socially constructed.
You are old enough now to let go of your academic nurse. The things you learned at college are not nationalism, and as far as I can see they are not useful tools. They lead you into error, from which everybody tries to pull you, and you, in your stubborness, refuse to be pulled.
Posted by DanielS on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 22:48 | #
‘Typically, you misundersdand’
Actually, typically, you misrepresent.
And no, I am not wrong.
I am not retailing Marxist nonsense; adaptive traits may be looked upon and treated in various ways, despite the fact that your British bitches want us to believe they have no choice, and especially, the foreign women, have no choice but to mud shark – and that you are their hero.
You have been old enough to grow up, and not pander to women who encourage right wing reaction, instigating luckier women to ykw and less lucky women to blacks and muslims.
You don’t know everyone, and your tilt against perceived academia is your personal ego trip which you engage at the expense of the time of all people of good will.
Posted by Captainchaos on Sat, 06 Oct 2018 00:00 | #
Daniel’s “Cartesian” and “hermeneutics” are the equivalent of Bowery’s “eusocial” and “individual.” One represents evil and the other represents good. Both of their obsessive souls are forever condemned to spergatory, wrestling between darkness and light.
Posted by DanielS on Sat, 06 Oct 2018 03:33 | #
Posted by Captainchaos on Fri, 05 Oct 2018 19:00 | #
Daniel’s “Cartesian” and “hermeneutics” are the equivalent of Bowery’s “eusocial” and “individual.” One represents evil and the other represents good. Both of their obsessive souls are forever condemned to spergatory, wrestling between darkness and light.
I am sure that that’s not true for my part (regarding Cartesianism and hermeneutics).
Furthermore, you got anything against spergatory?
Posted by Epistemic blunder on Sat, 06 Oct 2018 10:44 | #
Adaptive traits certainly are socially constructed, if only for how they come to count for us.
It is an epistemologial blunder, of course, to try to founationalize our cause in “nature.”
First of all, because that would not follow in terms of describing what our nature does.
We seek to assimilate natural health and natural ways which are conducive to the well being of our people, but we do not simply let nature dictate the terms of our interests – for an obvious example, we do not simply let a virus destroy our people, but we develop means to deal with it, from vaccines, to quarantine, improved practices, sanitation and so on.
What that is describing even, is the fact that we are founded in our people’s interests first – not firstly in nature, the ‘interests’ of its viruses and so on. We look at nature as a guide and check points to health and non-health.
But to foundationalize our cause in nature is an epistemologial blunder.
The proper foundation is in Social Constructionism. In our people. That is the position of Praxis, following Aristotle’s corrective program. And then, very much in line with Aristotle again, we look to nature as guide-line check points of a healthy social system – e.g. placing value on optimality as opposed to maximization as a guide to homeostasis (racial autonomy).
Next, we deploy the hermeneutic turn when this positive view is cramping our breadth of perspective, individualism and imagination – we use it to gain more historical perspective, or novel ideas, or we become a bit more Platonic, say, in order to get a broader formal perspective on our systems, and develop working hypotheses. But the Hermeneutic turn is always duty bound to its circulation of inquiry, against Cartesian runaway, it will return to empirical verification wherever necessary or desired.
DanielS
Posted by Julian Bigelow on Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:55 | #
Julian Bigelow
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Julian Bigelow (March 19, 1913 – February 17, 2003) was a pioneering American computer engineer.
Julian Bigelow at The Princeton Institute for Advanced Study (Left to right: Julian Bigelow, Herman Goldstine, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and John von Neumann).
Contents
1 Life
2 References
3 Further reading
4 External linksLife
Bigelow was born in 1913 in Nutley, New Jersey.[1] He obtained a master’s degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, studying electrical engineering and mathematics. During World War II, he assisted Norbert Wiener in his research on automated fire control for anti-aircraft guns, leading to the development of the so-called Wiener filter.
Bigelow coauthored (with Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth) one of the founding papers on cybernetics and modern teleology, titled “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology.” This paper mulled over the way mechanical, biological, and electronic systems could communicate and interact. This paper instigated the formation of the Teleological Society and later the Macy conferences. Bigelow was an active member of both organizations. He was a visiting scholar for many years at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.[2]
When John von Neumann sought to build one of the very first digital computers at the Institute for Advanced Study, he hired Bigelow in 1946 as his “engineer,” on Wiener’s recommendation. The computer Bigelow built following von Neumann’s design is called the IAS machine, although it was also called the MANIAC, a name that was later transferred to the successful clone of this machine at Los Alamos. Because von Neumann did not patent the IAS and wrote about it freely, 15 clones of the IAS were soon built. Nearly all general-purpose computers subsequently built are recognizable as influenced by the IAS machine’s design.
Bigelow died on February 17, 2003 in Princeton, New Jersey.[3]
References
Posted by Guessedworker on Tue, 12 Feb 2019 23:37 | #
Adaptive traits certainly are socially constructed, if only for how they come to count for us
The inflation (and I stress inflation) of certain evolutionarily adaptive traits can be expressed behaviourally. A woman in high heels or with rouged lips … a man displaying his personal status via symbols of power and wealth … these are obvious enough examples of socially-bound and deliberately, crudely-executed communication. But there are hundreds of subtle and marginal signs of fitness which completely elude the gross socialised behavioural modes of communication, and operate at a sublimely unconscious, neurological level, many of which do not even contribute to and reach the level of an awareness of a romantic idealization of the opposite sex.
Further, because socially communicative modes exist, that does not imply that social construction is involved in their expression. The impulses at work in a sincere and unguarded moment of sexual selection are far too quicksilver to be captured by the lumbering associative machinery of construction.
It is an epistemologial blunder, of course, to try to founationalize our cause in “nature.”
There is no other foundation for the organism which is Man, unless you do violence to the concept of foundation itself. The social environment is too contingent upon hazard and mechanicity to be identified as, or in any way conflated with, foundation. I cannot believe that you have reflected sufficiently on what foundation, contingency, hazard, and mechanicity imply in this respect. I think you have simply presumed these things, and the other signs of the lived life which I have written about at MR, to be inferior to your old university lecturer’s teachings as a matter of inevitability. You have made a mistake.
Posted by DanielS on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 04:41 | #
I have made no mistake but to have over estimated your wish to have the best in conceptual outlook and to underestimate the extent to which your jealousy of academia will have you chasing endlessly after the red capes of deliberately misrepresented and thereby misleading concepts.
It has been and apparently remains a very unfortunate bummer to deal with your reaction, but I will, in a moment.
Posted by DanielS on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 05:44 | #
Posted by Guessedworker on Tue, 12 Feb 2019 18:37 | #
DanielS: Adaptive traits certainly are socially constructed, if only for how they come to count for us.
Yes. and your taking issue with this statement, which should distinguish not only that there are limits but ultimate validity to social constructionism, goes to show that you are just a reactionary trying to show that you are smarter than “academics” by chasing after their and their students abuses and misuses of the idea.
It is possible for people to go Jim Jones and say that racial differences don’t matter, that we should all mix and ultimately kill ourselves because the world and life are so evil that people just don’t get it – take the Kook Aide, some 900 of you.
American society, its adherence to paleocon values, some fusion of Enlightenment and Judeo Christianity marshaled by Jewish academia has given the Kool Aide to people like yourself very nicely – to help obstruct social accountability in reaction.
GW: The inflation (and I stress inflation) of certain evolutionarily adaptive traits can be expressed behaviourally. A woman in high heels or with rouged lips … a man displaying his personal status via symbols of power and wealth … these are obvious enough examples of socially-bound and deliberately, crudely-executed communication.
I should not have posted the Julian Bigelow thing. It caught my eye because he is from the town (Nutley, New Jersey) next to mine and went on to work with a bunch of luminaries, like Wiener in cybernetics and John von Neumann (games theory etc.).
I did want to indicate that “my project” was not adverse to this sort of rigorous and scientific inquiry.
But no particular endorsement was implied, nor was it meant to imply confirmation of my own efforts as you apparently took it to mean by focusing on behavior as if you were going to ‘disprove me’ somehow by doing that.
Your commitment, as ever, is to try to trivialize me and my efforts and make yourself seem like the one and only with deep thoughts.
In so doing, you entirely miss the point, time and again.
So does Bowery (I see that a minion of his is hornily lurking in modernity, seeing that “nothing new” has been presented when I set out a bit of history), by suggesting that I am, or should be trying to do with Social Constructionism what social constructIVISM does, i.e., focus on the products of processes as opposed to the process itself.
GW: But there are hundreds of subtle and marginal signs of fitness which completely elude the gross socialised behavioural modes of communication, and operate at a sublimely unconscious, neurological level, many of which do not even contribute to and reach the level of an awareness of a romantic idealization of the opposite sex.
This goes only to demonstrate your narrow, retarded notion of communication (still in the transmissions model) and the social realm – especially when talking about how things come to count, post hoc.
GW: Further, because socially communicative modes exist, that does not imply that social construction is involved in their expression.
So, chasing the red cape of misused and misrepresented social constructionism is indeed, your thing.
It is a shame. You have stood in the way for seven years for nothing but your puerile reaction and lack of sufficient education.
GW: The impulses at work in a sincere and unguarded moment of sexual selection are far too quicksilver to be captured by the lumbering associative machinery of construction.
In post hoc attribution they are not too quick silver; and not if you want to protect your English women a whole lot better than you and your anti social society are currently doing.
GW: It is an epistemologial blunder, of course, to try to founationalize our cause in “nature.”
Yes – Nature divorced of praxis, that is (human nature).
GW: There is no other foundation for the organism which is Man,
Oh now YOU are going to teach ME about Praxis?
GW: unless you do violence to the concept of foundation itself.
Look, if you want to proclaim some general things as universally foundational I’m ok with that as a post hoc attribution – discreet nations for just about all the ethnicities, this kind of DNA counts as this kind of people, etc. ..but if these things ever exist outside of the possibility of conversation they may as well not exist at all – and that is profound, because it doesn’t only go to how facts count for us. It gives us the agency that our enemies want to take away from us – and have, starting perhaps with Christianity.
GW: The social environment is too contingent upon hazard and mechanicity to be identified as, or in any way conflated with, foundation
It is a bummer that you maintain such a crude misunderstanding.
I look back at what I have brought to bear these past seven years and I find with the recent relief from your puerile antagonism, that I have brought to bear good and important concepts and reasoning. And your angle and childish adherence to an antagonistic view, chasing after red capes, has been a misfortune, misleading others along with your having been misled – I see that the poor guy ecce lux is going around and labeling just anyone and anything he doesn’t like “social constructionist.”
Our Jewish adversaries would have it no other way.
GW: I cannot believe that you have reflected sufficiently on what foundation, contingency, hazard, and mechanicity imply in this respect.
Unlike you, I focus on the most essential and important things – which includes what You might call foundation (but I elect not to belabor that word), contingency, hazard and mechanicity –
I do not ignore them in a vain attempt to cast the other (me) as shallow and yourself as “deep.”
You are trying to render me trivial and if you can, wholly redundant. That’s yours and Bowery’s techno nerd thing – operationalize the circuit – beat it down until the weak link appears then remove it and replace it….
with YOUR intellectual conceit.
Meanwhile, you are not only ignoring that I am not trying to compete with you and render your more scientific quests redundant, but I cooperate and complement them with things that are actually quite often very important.
GW: I think you have simply presumed these things, and the other signs of the lived life which I have written about at MR, to be inferior to your old university lecturer’s teachings as a matter of inevitability. You have made a mistake.
Read what I said in the last sentence. I came here to cooperate with, not to overturn science.
All you are doing is expressing the puerile jealousy and antagonism to academia – in exaggerated form – that has become so central to your identity. You can’t even see the difference between what I am saying and what the “academics” you don’t like are saying through the stereotypes and misrepesentations that you depend upon as the foil for your ego trip. I have made no mistake but to over estimate your dedication to a collaborative effort to arrive at and deploy the best theory to the cause of European peoples.
The Jews thank you for all your reactive obstruction.
Anyway, in a few days, I am going to put up a new post. I’ve been delayed by a few things but its coming along nicely…
Posted by DanielS on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 05:57 | #
Posted by Captainchaos on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 06:54 | #
Is “muh dik” socially constructed?
Yes.
Posted by DanielS on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 07:40 | #
Correction
if these things exist outside of the possibility of conversation they may as well not exist – i.e., if we no longer exist to talk about them and decide at least how they count.
Posted by Captainchaos on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 20:21 | #
GW sounds like a blank-slatist the way he talks about the alleged plasticity of the human personality. As far as I am aware the balance of psychological research on the subject indicates the majority of variability in personality traits is accounted for by heredity.
Also, he seems content to leave what IS actually socially constructed for the crows.
Posted by DanielS on Sun, 05 Jan 2014 01:17 | #
…
I was inspired to post this in response to Keith Preston’s latest effort to obfuscate the nifty organizational structure of White identity that is provided by a new definition of the left and understanding of why Jews would not want us to be aware of that, but rather remain disorganized by saying we are “neither right nor left” or by letting them manoeuvre us into the old, destructive definition of us as rightists.
Perhaps I am too suspicious, but it seems organiztional efforts are being muddied by those who want Hitler to re-take the helm. This suspicion was increased by Stark’s interview with Anthony Migchels, it seems the latest enlisted to play this role of reconstructing the Jewish definitions of right and left, i.e. not allowing for a proper re-definition of the White left and its organizational power, but rather stalling for time to mollify the portrayal Hitler as a moderate, “no worse than other historical leaders.”